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Abstract
We present a dialogue on Funding Costs and Counterparty Credit
Risk modeling, inclusive of collateral, wrong way risk, gap risk and
possible Central Clearing implementation through CCPs. This frame-
work is important following the fact that derivatives valuation and risk
analysis has moved from exotic derivatives managed on simple single
asset classes to simple derivatives embedding the new or previously ne-
glected types of complex and interconnected nonlinear risks we address
here. This dialogue is the continuation of the “Counterparty Risk,
Collateral and Funding FAQ” by Brigo (2011). In this dialogue we
focus more on funding costs for the hedging strategy of a portfolio of
trades, on the non-linearities emerging from assuming borrowing and
lending rates to be different, on the resulting aggregation-dependent
valuation process and its operational challenges, on the implications
of the onset of central clearing, on the macro and micro effects on
valuation and risk of the onset of CCPs, on initial and variation mar-
gins impact on valuation, and on multiple discount curves. Through
questions and answers (Q&A) between a senior expert and a junior
colleague, and by referring to the growing body of literature on the
subject, we present a unified view of valuation (and risk) that takes
all such aspects into account.
∗This dialogue, available at damianobrigo.it, SSRN.com and arXiv.org, is sec-
ond in a series started with “Counterparty Risk, Collateral and Funding FAQ”, see
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1955204 or http://arxiv.org/abs/1111.1331.
See also the Wiley book “Counterparty Credit Risk, Collateral and Funding” [29]
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See also the first chapter of the Wiley Finance (March 2013)
Book “Counterparty Credit Risk, Collateral and Fund-
ing with Pricing Cases for all Asset Classes”
by Damiano Brigo1, Massimo Morini and Andrea Pallavicini
1This summary FAQ, together with the previous part [11], is based on the authors last 8
years of research and more specifically of papers [9], [10], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18],
[19], [20], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29], [30], [31], [32], [33], [34], [35], [36], [37],
[79], [80], [87], [88], [99], supported by several co-authors, including Claudio Albanese,
Imane Bakkar, Tom Bielecki, Cristin Buescu, Agostino Capponi, Kyriakos Chourdakis,
Nicola Moreni, Massimo Morini, Frank Oertel, Vasileios Papatheodorou, Frederic Patras,
Daniele Perini, Mirela Predescu, Marco Tarenghi and Roberto Torresetti. We are grateful
to all participants in the dinner at the Royal Society in London on Oct 27, 2011, and to
all participants of the Quant Congress Europe 2011, Global Derivatives 2012 and 2013,
Risk Minds US 2012, Risk Minds 2013, the Newton Institute meeting in Cambridge on
March 28 2013, and CVA Collateral Damages 2012 in Paris for helpful discussions on
CVA and Funding after training courses, plenary talks and over conference dinners. This
paper expresses the authors opinion and is in no way representative of the institutions the
authors work for or are associated with.
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1 A Dialogue on CCPs, Funding, Collateral
and Credit Risk
Although research on counterparty risk pricing and its extensions, at the
time without much collateral or funding costs analysis, started way back in
the nineties, with us joining the effort back in 2002, the different aspects of
counterparty credit risk and funding costs exploded after the beginning of
the financial crisis in 2007 and especially 2008. In less than four years we
have seen the emergence of a number of features that the market operators
are struggling to account for with consistency. Further, the several possible
definitions and methodologies for counterparty risk and funding costs may
create confusion. This dialogue is meant to provide a colloquial guide to
the different aspects of counterparty risk, collateral modeling and funding
costs, especially now that central clearing through CCPs and standard CSA
guided by ISDA are being implemented massively. It is in the form of a Q&A
between a CVA expert and a newly hired colleague, and provides detailed
references for investigating the different areas sketched here more in detail.
Important: This dialogue continues ideally from the dialogue in [11] or
in the first chapter of [29]. We advise the reader who is not familiar with
the previous dialogue to have a look at that dialogue, although the present
dialogue may be read independently.
2 Funding Costs Pricing: The full replication
approach
Q: [Junior colleague] We haven’t spoken for a while, it must have been one
year at least, how have you been?
A: Quite busy with the issues on funding costs actually, but it would be
good to catch up, indeed, I heard you have been doing well in your job
in this first year.
Q: Not too bad, thanks to your help too. Would you be ok to have a
second conversation? I found our first conversation to be quite helpful.
A: Yes we could have an update on funding probably, and then move on
discussing CCPs a little? Would that be of interest?
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Q: That would be fantastic. Let’s book a room here for tomorrow 3pm?
A: Sounds good!
Q: [The day after, at 3pm] Ok, we covered quite a lot of stuff in our
previous conversation. The inclusion of funding costs is still debated,
however, and we might restart from there?
A: Indeed. Let’s see what we have in the literature. The working paper
[48], then published in [49] and [50], remains one of the most com-
prehensive theoretical treatments I have seen so far. As we discussed
last time, one limitation is that it does not allow for underlying credit
instruments in the portfolio, and has possible issues with FX. It is a
very technical paper. A related framework that is more general and
includes most recent literature as a special case is in [87], that since
our last chat has been expanded and clarified further in [88]. I think
this is the most complete work so far, and it lead also to developments
on including funding effects in multiple discount curves, see [33], and
also to a rigorous pricing of a deal cleared with CCPs, by including the
margining fees and residual risks, see [86].
Q: Hey slow down please... this is too much in a single sentence and we
need to loosen this a little. Let’s take a couple of steps back to make
sure we followed the same reasoning in this year?
A: Good point, let’s check if we are aligned at least on the starting points.
What is the funding costs pricing problem? To put it in a nutshell,
when you need to manage a trading portfolio, you may need to obtain
cash and / or assets in order to do a number of operations: maintain the
hedge of the position, posting collateral on margin calls, paying interest
on collateral received, for example. This is cash / assets you may obtain
from your Treasury department or in the market. You may also receive
cash or assets as a consequence of being in the position: a coupon,
a notional reimbursement, a positive mark to market move, getting
some collateral, a closeout payment, receiving interest on collateral
you posted, a good movement in your hedge. All such flows need to be
remunerated: if you are borrowing, this will have a cost, and if you are
lending, this will provide you with some revenues. Including the cost
of funding into your valuation framework means to properly account
for such features.
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Q: You mention “hedging” and “valuation”, but valuation in the repli-
cation approach is based on a hedging portfolio that satisfies a self
financing condition, at least theoretically. This means you don’t need
to inject external funds to rebalance the replicating hedge. The hedge
can be fully financed thanks only to price movements of cash and risky
assets. Now you are telling me that the hedge may be expensive and
one may need to fund the hedge explicitly with external funds. Aren’t
we violating the self financing condition, and if so, are we authorized
to use a self financing and pricing approach?
A: Excellent point, in fact we are not violating the self financing condition
but we are extending it to a larger system, that includes our treasury,
collateral and market funding policies. There is still conservation, in
other terms, but on a larger level, as the idealized risk free rate bank
account, namely the numeraire of the risk neutral measure, is no longer
a real asset for us. You may remember the bank account and the risk
neutral measure from our previous discussion last year [11] [see previous
dialogue].
Q: But certainly this is stretching the replication approach a lot... can we
trade freely into the funding assets and the treasury and collateral ac-
counts? For example, I can understand that with re-hypothecation
”on” the collateral account becomes a sort of “tradeable” resource
whose borrowing and lending we can modulate so as to “trade” with
our own treasury department account, but this is not at all straight-
forward to me. And what happens if you don’t have the risk free bank
account anymore? How is your hedge implemented?
A: That’s a very good question and it’s interesting to list what Pallavicini
et al [87] [88] and Brigo et al [29] find: even if they start from a risk
neutral measure and a risk-free bank account accruing at the risk free
rate, once their derivation goes through the risk free rate disappears
and only real market funding and collateral rates remain to drive the
pricing equations.
Q: So the risk free rate would be a sort of hidden variable that does not
show up in the final valuation formula??
A: I’d say more an instrumental variable rather than a hidden variable.
You know, ”hidden variables” reminds me of the De Broglie-Bohm
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pilot wave theory in Quantum Mechanics, of Bell’s theorem and of the
ongoing discussion on the meaning of quantum theory... or another
analogy is that of bare mass in quantum field theory, it looks like the
risk free rate is like a bare mass but the funding rates are clothed mass...
Q: Ah, now wouldn’t this be a lovely topic to discuss. Why don’t we talk
about the so called Copenhagen interpretation with its infinite regresses
and magic measurements, or many worlds, or advanced action, or...
A: Don’t get carried away! That’s another debate entirely. Quantum
effects and complex numbers are forbidden in Finance!!! Or it’s your
job! [grinning]
Q: It could be useful to have a company that is defaulted and not defaulted
at the same time... I don’t know, Schroedinger LTD?
A: You are as funny as a headache on Saturday night, let’s get back to
the risk free instantaneous interest rate as an instrumental (rather than
hidden) variable, instrumental meaning that it does not play any role
in the end but is only instrumental for the derivation.
Q: I don’t know... sounds quite strange, if you use it...
A: Let’s look at the derivation. You start by writing the cash flows of
your financial product first, and I mean the basic cash flows associated
with the payout and dividends, driven by the key risk factors of your
instrument. So if you have an European equity call option the only
cash flow is at final maturity and is the payout of the option. If you
have a bond you’ll have coupons and a final notional reimbursement.
Etc.
Q: Ok so far so good. What next?
A: You then add the collateral costs, meaning the interest on collateral you
need to pay when you receive collateral, or the interest on collateral
you receive when you post collateral.
Q: Makes sense. What else?
A: You then add the default closeout term including of course the collateral
guarantee. Suppose your counterparty defaults first. At default you
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check if you have enough collateral or not in the account to cover your
loss, and you proceed with the collateral netting rules by ISDA. Again,
if there is considerable gap risk, you may find a relevant mismatch in a
number of scenarios, enough to generate a sizeable residual CVA. The
margin period of risk is also key: collateral disputes or other delays
in realigning the mark to market through collateral may enlarge the
margin period of risk to ten days, for example. In ten days, under a
stressed market, the mark to market of a deal can change considerably,
and the collateral last posted might become inadequate to cover the
loss.
Q: Can this effect really be that sizeable?
A: We discussed Gap risk already in our previous conversation one year
ago [11]. However a refresher might indeed be good. Ok, summing up:
through margining, the collateral account, at the periodic margining
dates, contains an amount that is close to the actual value of the port-
folio to the collateral receiver and if one counterparty were to default,
the amount would be used by the surviving party as a guarantee (and
viceversa). Gap Risk is the residual risk that is left, due to the fact
that the realignment is only periodical. If the market were to move a
lot between two realigning (”margining”) dates, a significant loss would
still be faced.
Q: You know, there is this folk belief: Collateral completely kills CVA and
gap risk is negligible.
3 Gap Risk
A: I am going to show you an example where this is not the case at all.
These plots I am showing you in my tablet now are taken from [18] and
[17]. First example: Collateralized bilateral CVA for a netted portfolio
of interest rate swaps (IRS) with 10y maturity and 1y coupon tenor
for different default-time correlations with (and without) collateral re-
hypothecation.
Q: What does this figure show?
D. Brigo, A. Pallavicini: CCPs, Funding Costs, Collateral and Credit FAQ / Q&A 9
Figure 1: CVA after collateralization (Gap Risk) for a interest rate swap
portfolio
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A: Figure 1 shows the BVA(namely DVA-CVA) for a ten-year IRS under
collateralization through margining as a function of the update fre-
quency δ with zero correlation between rates and counterparty spread,
zero correlation between rates and investor spread, and zero correlation
between the counterparty and the investor defaults. The model allows
for nonzero correlations as well. The Continuous lines represent the
re-hypothecation case, while dotted lines represent the opposite case.
The red line represents an investor riskier than the counterparty, while
the blue line represents an investor less risky than the counterparty.
All values are in basis points.
Q: I see very small numbers, below 2 basis points? Collateral seems to be
very effective here, residual DVA-CVA is almost zero.
A: Indeed, from the Figure, we see that the case of an investor riskier than
the counterparty (M/H) leads to positive value for DVA-CVA, while the
case of an investor less risky than the counterparty has the opposite
behaviour. If we inspect the DVA and CVA terms as in the paper we
see that when the investor is riskier the DVA part of the correction
dominates, while when the investor is less risky the counterparty has
the opposite behaviour Re-hypothecation enhances the absolute size of
the correction, a reasonable behaviour, since, in such case, each party
has a greater risk because of being unsecured on the collateral amount
posted to the other party in case of default. But you are right numbers
are very small and collateral here is very effective.
Q: So folk opinions are right here?
A: Wait a minute. Let us now look at a case with more contagion: a CDS.
Figure 2 refers to a payer CDS contract as underlying. If the investor
holds a payer CDS, he is buying protection from the counterparty, i.e.
he is a protection buyer. We assume that the spread in the fixed leg of
the CDS is 100 while the initial equilibrium spread is about 250. Given
that the payer CDS will be positive in most scenarios, when the investor
defaults it is quite unlikely that the net present value be in favor of the
counterparty. We then expect the CVA term to be relevant and DVA
negligible, given that the related option will be mostly in the money.
This is confirmed by our outputs. We see in the figure a relevant CVA
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Figure 2: CVA after collateralization (Gap Risk) for a CDS
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component (part of the bilateral DVA - CVA) starting at 10 and ending
up at 60 bps when under high correlation.
Q: This is definitely sizeable
A: We also see that, for zero correlation, collateralization succeeds in com-
pletely removing CVA, which goes from 10 to 0 basis points.
However, collateralization seems to become less effective as default de-
pendence grows, in that collateralized and uncollateralized CVA be-
come closer and closer, and for high correlations we still get 60 basis
points of CVA, even under collateralization.
Q: So collateral isn’t doing anything here with high default correlation
between CDS and counterparty? But why?
A: The reason for this is the instantaneous default contagion that, un-
der positive dependency, pushes up the intensity/credit spread of the
survived entities, as soon as there is a default of the counterparty.
Q: Ah...
A: You see? The term structure of the on-default survival probabilities
(see paper) lies significantly below the one of the pre-default survival
probabilities conditioned on pre-default information, especially for large
default correlation.
The result is that the default leg of the CDS will increase in value due
to contagion, and instantaneously the Payer CDS will be worth more.
This will instantly increase the loss to the investor, and most of the
CVA value will come from this jump.
Q: And given the instantaneous nature of the jump, the value at default
will be quite different from the value at the last date of collateral post-
ing, before the jump, and this explains the limited effectiveness of col-
lateral under significantly positive default dependence. I see.
A: This is a pathological case. In general gap risk will generate a residual
Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA) term after collateralization. Of
course you also include the case where you default first, and this will
lead to a Debit Valuation Adjustment (DVA) term, also inclusive of col-
lateral netting. You basically have to distinguish eight cases depending
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on who defaults first, on the sign of the exposure at default, ie whether
the deal is in your favour or in favour of the counterparty at the time
of default, and finally on the sign of the collateral account. Is the ac-
count guaranteeing you at the time of default of your counterparty or
is there collateral you posted in the account? The latter may happen
with sudden mark to market turns and would be the worst case, as you
risk losing both your mark to market (exposure) and your collateral.
Q: I see, and this generates the familiar CVA and DVA terms after collat-
eralization, that are usually small except under strong gap risk, that
we discussed one year ago [11] and your example just clarified this very
nicely.
A: Correct, and now you finally need to add the funding costs of main-
taining your hedge. This is a sort of carry cost of maintaining the risky
assets accounts and also the cash account necessary to keep the hedge
going. If you work with your treasury you have your bank treasury
interest to pay on the amounts you borrow, and if you spare some bor-
rowing you have a benefit. If you borrow or lend risky assets in a Repo
or Stock lending market the associated rates will be included also in
the funding cost calculation.
Q: Ok so we listed the following fundamental product cash flows and ad-
justments cash flows:
– Basic instruments cash flows and coupons before credit collateral
and funding
– Costs and benefits of maintaining the collateralization process (in-
terest on collateral)
– At default, if before the end of the deal, default closeout cost, with
residual CVA and DVA after collateralization;
– Funding costs and benefits for the cash and risky assets compo-
nents of the hedge, whether these are obtained by the treasury or
directly in the market;
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4 Funding costs: nonlinearities and aggrega-
tion
A: Excellent, you have been paying attention. Now, the big difficulty is
this. The fact that borrowing and lending happens at different rates,
is quite crucial. So the rate you will have to use to accrue your benefit
or cost depends on the future sign of your accounts, because the sign
determines whether you are borrowing or lending. Now the future sign
of your accounts depends on the future value of your portfolio, which
in turns depends on the funding rates depending on that. So you
have a sort of recursive valuation problem. If you write it in terms of
discounted cash flows, you find that the risk free rate disappears and
that the collateral and funding rates you need to discount and accrue
do depend on the future value of the claim you are pricing. Let me
repeat this:
Consider the collateral and funding rates you need to discount and ac-
crue your product future cash flows in the risk neutral expectation lead-
ing to the product price. These rates depend on the future value of the
very same product you are pricing.
Hence to determine the value of the claim at time 0, say V0, you need
to take an expectation of cash flows accrued and discounted at funding
and collateral rates that depend on future Vt’s (t ≥ 0). This is clearly
a recursive problem.
Q: And you mentioned also non-linearity??
A: Indeed. You see, to better understand this we need to take a step back
to classic Black Scholes or risk neutral valuation a la Harrison and
Kreps / Pliska. Note that no arbitrage could be based on a different
notion of inequalities or betting quotients, see Dalang Morton Willinger
or, much earlier, Bruno de Finetti or Frank Ramsey, but we won’t deal
with that here and we will use the replication approach...
Q: My understanding for the importance of this distinction is about zero...
A: ... In Black Scholes one uses the self-financing condition of the hedge
portfolio plus the modified chain rule (Ito’s formula) on the claim value
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as a function of the risky underlying of the trade to obtain a linear
(parabolic) PDE whose solution is the claim price.
Q: Ok this is one of the classical derivations of the Black Scholes PDE.
A: Now there is the Feynman Kac theorem: solutions of linear (parabolic)
PDEs of the Black Scholes type can be written as Expected values in
risk neutral pricing of the product final cash flows, discounted at the
risk free rate. Viceversa, expected values in the risk neutral measure
can be written as solutions of linear PDEs. This is, incidentally, how
one can solve PDEs by Monte Carlo simulation.
Q: Is that why quantitative finance has largely abandoned the PDE ap-
proach in favour of stochastic methods? Because in high dimension
simulation is possible while numerical PDE solution in dimension larger
than 3 is very hard?
A: Partly, but there is also the appealing risk neutral interpretation and
the measure Q that we discussed one year ago [11], a measure under
which all risky assets have the risk free return r, remember? This is an
excellent model for a fair market...
Q: We digress... Ok, in Black Scholes the self financing condition plus Ito’s
formula gives me a linear PDE that I could also solve by simulation as
an expected value of discounted cash flows under a risk neutral measure,
discounted at the risk free rate. Got that. So what?
5 Nonlinear PDEs, nonlinear expectations and
BSDEs
A: What? Well, now imagine a slightly different situation, that is what
happens in our funding case with asymmetric borrowing and lending
rates. If the discount and accruing rates depend on the future values of
the very same solution we are trying to compute through the discounted
expectation, this does not translate into a linear parabolic PDE as in
the Black Scholes theory, but rather into a non-linear PDE.
Q: That’s where the non-linearity comes from, I see... in the Black Scholes
theory the risk free discount and accruing rate does not depend on the
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future value of the claim, so I have a straightforward expectation... with
funding costs I don’t... What are the consequences of this nonlinearity?
It does not look good from your face...
A: Is my makeup melting? No matter. It is indeed worrying. As you
probably guessed, the valuation of a portfolio is aggregation dependent.
In the classical pricing theory a la Black Scholes, if we have 2 or more
derivatives in a portfolio we can price each separately and then add up,
to obtain the whole price of the portfolio. Moreover, while in Black
Scholes the price of the whole portfolio to one party is minus the price
of the portfolio to the other party, with funding costs this symmetry is
broken, because the calculation is not bilateral in general.
Q: Why not?
A: Because we don’t know the other entity funding policy and hence we
cannot know their funding costs. And why should they accept to pay
our funding costs for us and why should we accept to pay them theirs?
After all, their funding inefficiency is not our fault... however we have
to be careful because there are two symmetries that are violated here
and it’s easy to confuse them.
Q: Well now you were talking about symmetry with respect to the two
trading parties I guess. If B trades with C and sees a price V , then
C should see a price −V in the same trade with B. This is the first
symmetry, and it is violated by funding costs because one party cannot
check the funding costs of the other one easily, so that charging each
other funding costs explicitly and agreeing on the other party charge is
not possible. What is the other symmetry?
A: It’s the long-short symmetry. Without credit, collateral and funding
risk, if you are long a product with discounted cash flows Π, the price is
the opposite of the short position with cash flows −Π. This symmetry
is broken also via the nonlinearity of funding costs.
Q: But probably that’s embedded in the quoted price without us realizing
it and it becomes part of the bid offer negotiation?
A: Possibly, but some banks do charge the funding inclusive price to the
client anyway by quoting an explicit funding component, or ”FVA”.
However, let’s go back to nonlinearities.
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Q: OK
A: Because of nonlinearity, these aspects of additive decomposition no
longer hold in presence of funding costs. The price becomes aggrega-
tion dependent. You need to decide a priori at what portfolio level
you are pricing because prices of sub-portfolios do not add up. And
once the level of aggregation is set, the funding valuation problem is
non-separable, because the funding rates patch everything together by
depending on the future value of the whole portfolio at the chosen
aggregation level, and not just of its local components. A holistic ap-
proach is needed and consistent modeling across trading desks and asset
classes is needed. Internal competition in banks does not favour this
but it is a must if one is to try and price/risk manage these aspects
consistently.
Q: Sounds revolutionary in scope, even if it comes from a very simple
financial fact, borrowing and lending at different rates...
A: Well the maths is not revolutionary, this kind of problem with asym-
metric rates had been explored way back already (without credit risk or
collateral) by El Karoui, Peng and Quenez [57], and the resulting tool,
Backwards Stochastic Differential Equations (BSDEs), more on these
in a minute, have been know for a long time in finance. In fact if we
had to give credit where credit is due, to the best of my knowledge the
first to come up with the understanding that different discount rates
for borrowing and lending would lead to fundamental nonlinearities was
Bergman back in 1995 [3]. The new aspect is that now these nonlin-
ear features are showing up very fundamentally, much more so than in
the past, and so it is very hard to ignore them even for mainstream
quantitative analysts.
Q: That’s a lot to take in!
6 Funding costs: Claim dependent pricing
measures
A: I’m not done yet. The classical transaction-independent arbitrage free
price is lost, now the price depends on the specific entities trading the
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product and on their policies. In fact the so called pricing measure now
depends on the specific trading strategy adopted for the deal being
priced. This is a point that is stressed well both in Pallavicini et al
[87] [88], and in [94]. In Pallavicini et al the risk neutral expectations
such as Ef are taken under a specific pricing measure depending on
the funding rates f of the treasury, that in turn depend on the future
values of the claim we are pricing. Hence the pricing measure depends
on the claim we are pricing, as I explained earlier. I’m stressing this
point many times because it is key. It is like ”relativizing” the pricing
measure, that is no longer the measure associated with the abstract and
somewhat fictional but universal risk free bank account B, see again
our previous conversation [11].
Q: So a very simple financial fact like the fact that borrowing and lending
may happen at different rates is generating all this amount of compli-
cations and nonlinearity?
A: Correct. In fact I mentioned expectations above but a better term
would be ”nonlinear expectations”, namely expectations under a prob-
ability measure that sort of depends on the random variable whose
expectation we are taking. Another way of saying this is that non-
linear PDEs do not translate properly in expected values. That is the
basic Feynman Kac theorem but it only works for risk neutral valuation
without funding costs. In fact, nonlinear PDEs translate probabilisti-
cally into BSDEs. BSDEs may be difficult animals to solve numerically,
but they have been around a long time, especially in their semi- and
quasi-linear variants. They have been used also for no good deal the-
ory. There are very technical works on nonlinear expectations, see for
example [90].
Q: Ok, it’s a pity I hadn’t realized the importance of this and had thought
these to be technicalities.
A: It’s quite important. You could see it partly as the end of Platonic pric-
ing. There is no Platonic measure Q in the sky to price all derivatives
with an expectation where all assets have the risk free return r.
Now the pricing measure is product dependent, and every trade will
have a specific measure. This is an implication of the PDE non-linearity
and we need to decide the level of aggregation a priori.
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Q: Mmmhhh
A: Other markets had realized a long time ago that a product price would
also depend on the conditions under which the product itself is traded
and on the company policies. Finance arrived at this conclusion quite
late, even if market practitioners had been doing this in a sort of implicit
way.
Q: Well I think we need to agree on the term ”price”. I tend to see
”price” as something coming out from a process of bid and offer, and
negotiation, whereas there is another term I’d use, ”value”, for the
actual value I perceive in entering a trade. The latter is not necessarily
what I pay for it.
A: Well of course the distinction between price and value is a classic in
economics, but in the end does it matter?
Q: I think it does. You mentioned that charging ”FVA” to the counter-
party is controversial, and that FVA cannot be bilateral, since we do
not know the funding policy of our counterparties. So even if DVA was
giving us some hope to realign symmetry of prices after introducing
CVA, funding finally destroys the law of one price and makes prices
a matter of perspective if included: direction, aggregation level... So
should this be implicitly quoted in the Bid Ask price and be smoothed
away by negotiation? Should we think more explicitly to an Equilib-
rium approach? These are important questions to me.
A: Ok, I see you are critical (and not without reason) about explicitly
charging a (even unilateral) FVA to a counterparty, but if we don’t, how
would you use the funding inclusive price? Should we avoid computing
it in the first place?
Q: Again, is the funding inclusive ”price” a real price? Each entity com-
putes a different funding adjusted price for the same product and at
different level of aggregation. The funding adjusted ”price” is not a
price in the conventional sense. We may use it for cost/profitability
analysis or to pay our treasury, but can we charge it to a client? Again,
why should the client pay for our funding inefficiencies? Indeed, it is
more a ”value” than a ”price”.
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A: However you call it, it is hard to compute quickly.
Q: Even if we decided to compute it for internal cost analysis or profitabil-
ity analysis, we woud have to deal with BSDEs, nonlinear PDEs, how
can one make these things work in practice?
A: It’s quite hard. Banks may force separability between FVA and CVA,
DVA etc and additivity of the different adjustments by assuming the
borrowing and lending rates to be symmetric, perhaps an average of the
two, and by linearizing payoffs and simplifying discounting, assuming
statistical independence, obtaining that funding costs reduce simply to
different discount adjustments. Of course this only holds under heroic
assumptions and is not precise at all, and in specific situation can be
quite misleading.
Q: I see... that’s why most people in the industry address funding through
discounting. Funny I had never read the complete story.
A: This is hardly complete, not least because it is not obvious at all that
funding costs are really replicable, so that the derivations above, based
on replication / hedging arguments, may fail and more actuarial based
approaches could be taken. This is currently under investigation in [21]
from what I heard at a seminar here in London.
Q: I have to say also that now I understand better the point on non-
separability you made one year ago [11] [Sighing]. A number of prac-
titioners advocate a “Funding Valuation Adjustment”, or FVA, that
would be additive so that the total price of the portfolio would be
RISK FREE PRICE + DVA - CVA - FVA
However, we have seen that proper inclusion of funding costs leads to
a recursive pricing problem where the discount and accrual rates in
the so called FVA term depend on the whole future value of the claim,
including future CVA and DVA, so that the pure decomposition of the
risks above is delusional, FVA depends on all other risks as well and is
not a pure funding adjustment.
A: Good to hear that.
Q: I’m frustrated from the fact that the literature on funding is quite
sparse and partial in many cases.
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A: Well it is developing fast, but we may review a little the past contribu-
tions if that helps you put all we said into context?
Q: Yes that would be good, thank you.
7 Funding costs: earlier contributions
A: Ok let’s take a couple of steps back and look at some of the earlier
works. They are partial but still quite important.
Q: For example?
A: You may recall that the industry paper [92] considers the problem of
replication of derivative transactions under collateralization but with-
out default risk and in a purely classical Black and Scholes framework,
considering then two relatively basic special cases. When you derive
the first basic results that way, you have to be very careful on the way
you formulate the self financing condition, see for example [15].
Q: Ok but aside from the self financing condition, I would imagine that
default modeling is important in collateral and funding, isn’t it? That
is the reason why collateral is introduced in the first place.
A: Indeed, but sometimes explicit modeling of default is avoided because
inclusion of default risk is quite complicated. The fundamental fund-
ing implications in presence of default risk have been considered in
simple settings first in [84], see also [43]. These works focus on partic-
ularly simple products, such as zero coupon bonds or loans, in order to
highlight some essential features of funding costs. [59] analyzes impli-
cations of currency risk for collateral modeling, and has been followed
by a similar paper later in [93]. [39] resorts to a PDE approach to
funding costs.
Q: That’s quite a number of references already. What is the level of gen-
erality here and what are the most comprehensive approaches?
A: As I mentioned above Crepey (2012) [49] with [50], and Pallavicini
et al (2011, 2013) [87] with [88] remain the most general treatments
of funding costs to date. These papers show how complicated it is
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to formulate a proper general framework with collateral and funding
costs but inclusive of default risk. In fact, more recently, [94] did a good
job of expressing the funding costs valuation problem in mainstream
asset pricing and replication theory, but with a high technical level of
complexity and a number of assumptions. The end result is very similar
to [87] and [88] in terms of pricing implications, aggregation, strategy
dependent measures, nonlinearities...
Q: Good, we discussed above some of these general frameworks, but what
are instead the findings in Morini and Prampolini [84]? I heard of this
paper when it was still a preprint.
A: One important point in Morini and Prampolini [84] is that in simple
payoffs such as bonds DVA can be interpreted as funding, in order to
avoid double counting. However, this result does not extend to general
payoffs, where different aspects interact in a more complex way and
the general approaches we described above are needed.
8 Funding costs: DVA and FVA
Q: What is the basic argument to interpret DVA in Funding terms?
A: DVA is related to funding costs in particular situations when the payout
is uni-directional, e.g. shorting/issuing a bond, borrowing in a loan, or
going short a call or put option. Indeed, if we are short simple products
that are uni-directional in terms of payments to happen in the future,
then we are basically borrowing.
Q: I see that.
A: As we shorted a bond or a call option, for example, we received cash
equivalent to the product price in the beginning, say V0, and we will
have to pay the product payout in the end. This cash V0 we received
as product price can be used by us to fund other activities, and allows
us to spare the costs of funding this same amount of cash V0 from our
treasury.
Q: All right, now if I try to compute the interest amount I am saving by
not borrowing an amount V0 from the treasury...
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A: Indeed, how much would the treasury charge your trading desk if you
borrowed that cash V0? Our treasury usually funds in the market, and
the market charges our treasury a cost of funding that is related to the
borrowed amount V0, to the period T on which we are borrowing, and
to our own bank credit risk.
Q: I see, these are roughly the same drivers as the drivers of DVA, that
depends on our own bank default risk and on the price we would be
trading without credit risk. In this sense the funding cost we are sparing
when we avoid borrowing looks similar to DVA: it is related to the price
of the object we are shorting and to our own credit risk. I see that now.
But...
A: You are going to argue that there are a number of assumptions that are
needed to identify DVA with a funding benefit, and indeed this is the
case. The single direction flows is one of them, but there is a number of
other points. Your treasury department for example does not necessar-
ily fund single trades separately but often adopts a strategy based on
internal fund transfer pricing, maturity transformation, netting sets, to
a point where the rate that is charged to the trading desk is hardly a
simple credit spread of the bank over the risk free rate. In this sense
the actual funding cost is a function of the treasury policy and may be
more complicated to analyze. Pallavicini et al [87] [88] look at this and
give two examples of treasury funding policy, showing how valuation
changes according to those and the simple DVA analogy does not work.
Q: All right, ten more papers to read...
9 CCPs
Q: You know, all these matters with funding make me wish there was a
way to avoid this completely. Last year in our earlier conversation [11]
we talked about margin lending. Thinking back to what we had said,
do you think there are many reasons why one might prefer to trade
through a margin lender than through central clearing, for example a
Central Clearing Counterparty (CCP) like DTCC, LCH, CME...
A: Ah, CCPs, they are like the elephant in the room [smiles tiredly]...
Well you see, sometimes there are particular trades that are sensitive
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and that the bank management would not have appearing in central
clearing-houses, or other times the trades are too specific and non-
standard, so they would be a little outside the usual CCP domain.
Q: But for those that are relatively standard? After all, we don’t see many
exotic products these days.
A: It’s not just the type of product, it may have to do with the specific
environment or context for a trade. But now it’s quite late [watches
clock on the wall], let’s call it a day and continue tomorrow, even quants
need to eat and rest!
Q: [Yawns] In fact I’m exhausted, this discussion is exciting but also very
tiring, I’ll dream of collateral damage, wrong way lanes, probability
measures and CCCP!!!
A: [Stretching] I’ll dream about a world withoug scarce resources and with-
out economics, money and finance, perhaps something like Star Trek.
Q: [One day later...] All right... let’s talk about CCPs a little more in
detail. Why do we care about CVA etc if CCPs will kick in?
10 CCPs: are CVA and Funding analysis still
relevant?
A: A common misunderstanding in the industry and academia is that the
onset of CCPs will make all calculations of counterparty risk pricing
and funding costs irrelevant.
Q: And that is not true?
A: I can only tell you what I believe. I think this is indeed a misunder-
standing and we need to move beyond this narrow understanding of
valuation, hedging, credit and liquidity risk and collateral modeling.
Q: What do you mean by ”narrow”?
A: Let us start with an obvious question: what are CCPs? CCPs are
commercial entities, and I point out ”commercial”, that, ideally, would
interpose themselves between the two parties in a trade.
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Q: Ok, I think I know this
A: Consider the following points [enumerating with fingers]:
– Each party will post collateral margins say daily, every time the
mark-to-market goes against that party. This is called ”variation
margin”.
– Collateral will be passed by the CCP to the other party as a
guarantee.
– If a party in the deal defaults and the mark-to-market is in favour
of the other party, then the surviving party has obtained the col-
lateral from the CCP and will not be affected, in principle, by
counterparty risk.
– Moreover, there is also an initial margin that is supposed to cover
for additional risks like deteriorating quality of collateral, gap risk,
wrong way risk, and so on.
– This initial margin is kept by the CCP and not passed to the
opposite party. The CCP may charge both parties for the initial
margin.
– If the CCP defaults initial margins can be lost
Q: Ah but CCPs cannot default, come on, that’s the whole point.
11 CCPs: Past Defaults
A: On the contrary, CCPs can default and did default. Defaulted ones:
– 1974: Caisse de Liquidation des Affaires en Marchandises;
– 1983: Kuala Lumpur Commodity Clearing House;
– 1987: Hong Kong Futures Exchange.
– The ones that were close to default- 1987: CME and OCC, USA;
1999: BM&F, Brazil.
Q: Seriously, how can you expect entities like LCH or DTCC to default?
They are too big to.. oh my...
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Figure 3: Bilateral trades and exposures without CCPs (on the left) and
with CPPs (on the right). Each node lists the sum of positive exposures,
each arrows the due cash flows. The diagram refers to the discussion in [71].
A: Too big to fail? Indeed, if the CCPs become aggregated more and more
into a few very large ones, they could become the mother of all ”too
big to fail”. See [78] for example, dealing also with conflict of interests
in CCPs.
Q: Ok that is certainly important and alarming, but we were talking about
valuation?
12 CCPs: Netting benefits
A: I think we need to get the big picture straight before going into details.
So back to that: the benefit of CCPs is supposed to be the large netting
they may introduce in the financial system. Let me illustrate that with
a drawing [gets up, draws Figure 3 on the whiteboard].
Q: Ok, even as a toy example this definitely looks like a good thing. How-
ever I hardly expect this to cover all the macro implications?
A: There are further important considerations on the macroeconomic and
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systemic effects of CCPs. As discussed in [91], it is worth keeping in
mind that CCPs are usually highly capitalized. All clearing members
post collateral in an asymmetric way. Initial margin means clearing
members are over-collateralized all the time.
Q: Do you think this initial margin requirements will bring about a liq-
uidity strain?
A: Well in a way you may see Collateral and Margining as a machinery
that transforms partly credit risk into liquidity risk.
Q: Say that again?
A: As we discussed above, collateral greatly reduces counterparty risk,
even if one has to be careful with contagion, gap risk, disputes, col-
lateral volatility, FX effects etc. Ok? So overall in non-pathological
situations collateral reduces counterparty credit risk almost to zero,
but forces you to find funds to post the collateral itself if you are the
party who is facing adverse mark to market.
Q: Ah I see...
A: Where will you find liquid assets or cash to be posted in the collat-
eral account? This may prove to be a liquidity strain as you need to
guarantee collateral is there at every margin call. On top of variation
margin calls, you also have initial margins or independent amounts,
depending on the context, covering the “pathological” risks such as
contagion, gap risk, extreme wrong way risk etc. The overall effect is
that in most situations one will not face relevant credit risk any more
but there is the need to find liquidity to keep the initial and variation
margins payments going.
Q: So you are saying this initial margin requirements will bring about a
liquidity strain, either through CCPs or SCSAs?
13 CCPs: Liquidity Strain
A: The TABB Group [95] says extra collateral impact of full CCP onset
could be about 2 $ Trillion!! It’s about the GDP of the UK so we are
definitely talking about a big liquidity impact on the system
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Q: But at least the netting benefit we discussed above, which is key, is
hardly debatable, right?
A: Looking at the systemic implications, netting should improve in princi-
ple as everything goes through CCPs, as we have seen in the toy exam-
ple above. However, in reality this is not so clear. A typical bank may
have a quite large number of outstanding trades, making the netting
clause quite material. With just one CCP for all asset classes across
countries and continents, netting efficiency would certainly improve.
Q: And it’s not like that in reality?
A: In real life CCPs deal with specific asset classes or geographical ar-
eas, and this may even reduce netting efficiency compared to now, as
discussed in [47]. CCPs compete with each other and one can be com-
petitive in specific areas but hardly in all of them. Some CCPs will
be profitable in specific asset classes and countries. They will deal
mostly with standardized transactions. Even if CCPs could function
across countries, bankruptcy laws can make collateral held in one place
unusable to cover losses in other places, as pointed out in [97].
Q: Are you saying that there is a lack of consistency and coordination
across jurisdictions?
14 CCPs: Jurisdictions
A: The geographical angle seems to be an issue, with no international law
addressing how CCPs would connect through EMIR/CDR 4/Basel III
and DFA. For example, as of 2012 there was “No legal construct to
satisfy both Dodd Frank Act and EMIR and allow EU clients to access
non-EU CCPs” [101].
Q: Could this really make a difference? What else can make CCPs risky?
A: To compete with each other CCPs may lower margin requirements,
which would make them riskier, remembering also the above CCPs
defaults. In the US, where the OTC derivatives market is going through
slightly more than 10 large dealers and is largely concentrated among 5,
we could have a conflict of interest. If CCPs end up incorporating most
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trades currently occurring OTC bilaterally, then CCPs could become
“too big to fail” [78], as we mentioned earlier.
Q: But despite all this macro discussion you cannot deny that CCPs would
greatly improve credit risk of the system?
A: Well I think the “too big to fail” danger cannot be ignored.
Q: Fair enough, I’d agree with that...
15 CCPs: Initial margins potential loss and
CCPs competition
A: ... and consider also the following. The CCP does not post part of the
collateral (initial margins) directly to the entities trading with it, as
the collateral agreement is not symmetric. We mentioned this above
already. If you trade with collateral but without a CCP, say through
a ISDA SCSA and subsequent updates, you are in a situation like this
[draws Figure 4 on the whiteboard]. So you exchange both variation
and initial margins.
Q: Ok, and what is different with CCPs?
A: With CCPs, one has the over-collateralization cost to lose in a uncol-
lateralized type CVA situation. The situation is like this [draws Figure
5 on the board]. The CCPs passes the variation margin to the other
party but not the initial margin. Hopefully, the default probability
of the CCP itself is low, making CVA towards the CCP small, bar
strong contagion, gap risk and wrong-way risk, that may or may not
be adequately covered by initial margins.
Q: Ok but what are the implications on valuation and analytics? As I
mentioned earlier, are CCPs safe enough to make all calculations we
discussed in the previous meetings pointless?
A: [Sighs tiredly] Even with CCPs in place, one needs a strong analytical
and numerical apparatus for pricing/hedging and risk. For all the rea-
sons we illustrated, CCPs are not the end of CVA and its funding costs
extensions. We need to consider and analyze:
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Figure 4: Flows of initial and variation margin within counterparties acting
in a bilateral contract via a CSA. IM stands for initial margin, while VM for
variation margin. The two margins flow in both directions.
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Figure 5: Flows of initial and variation margin within counterparties acting
in a centrally cleared contract. IM stands for initial margin, and it flows
only towards the CCP. VM stands for variation margin, and it flows in both
directions.
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– initial margin charges across different CCPs to see which ones best
reflect actual gap risk and contagion. This requires a strong and
consistent pricing apparatus;
– computing counterparty risk associated with the default of the
CCP itself and of clearing members, taking into account backup
members;
– understanding quantitatively the consequences of the lack of co-
ordination among CCPs across different countries and currencies.
These are just a few examples of the type of valuation problems on has
with CCPs.
Q: Look, I know you are doing your best and you look tired now, but I
have to be honest here, I am getting skeptical...
A: On what? Nothing wrong with that however, in general, as long as you
motivate your skepticism convincingly
Q: Here, please have some tea, and let me explain. Let’s take it easy.
You seem to be saying that we may want to compare different margin
proposals from different CCPs to see which ones best reflect risk pricing,
and to make sure the CCP is careful enough? Forgive me but this does
not look realistic to me.
A: [Sipping tea] Mmmhhh I think I know what you are going to say next...
Q: Allow me to say it anyway. Most banks would trade with the CCP
offering good conditions rather than with a CCP with higher costs.
What types of market players are going to accept a higher cost because
it agrees with their own risk analysis and they think that paying higher
costs makes the CCP, or the system more generally, safer?
A: I’ll use a loose analogy here, but suppose there is a home insurance
provider that is on record for having been close to bankruptcy several
times and also known for not offering good coverage in that the insurer
tries to dodge most claims. There is a second one that is know to
be more solid and that generally has a better record of paying claims.
However the second one is more expensive. Which one would you pick
to insure your own home?
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Q: In this case I agree I would pick the expensive one, but I don’t think
this is a good analogy. Are market players resorting to CCPs because
they really believe this will cover their risks or are they going to do that
just to avoid heavy capital requirements associated with CVA Value at
Risk etc? In the former case you may be right, but in the latter this
looks more like car insurance where you buy just the basic insurance
requested by law, where you make sure the insurance pays the other
party damage in case you are guilty in a car accident. In this case you
are going for the insurance company with lowest cost, since it is the
other party in the accident that will possibly face the low quality of
the insurance you bought at a low cost for you.
A: I see your objection, it is a little cynical but I cannot deny we need to
look at this possibility. However why don’t we assume banks are trying
to do the right thing for a start and take that as a reasonable basis for
our analysis?
Q: Ok we can reason on this setup, but please keep in mind my caveats, I
don’t think they are that unrealistic really. But I have another objec-
tion...
A: [rolling eyes skywards...] Let’s have it!
Q: Do you really think a quantitative analysis like the one you mentioned
above would not be overridden by political and administrative consid-
erations? The decision to trade with a particular CCP might be driven
by existing relationship, by past cooperation, even by peer pressure in
some cases. Modeling might have nothing to do with it.
A: Of course. However even if you do not “optimize” over the CCP choice,
and you accept one for “political” reasons, you may want to check the
costs the CCP is imposing you to see if they are roughly right in terms
of order of magnitude, and you may want to price residual risks. Do
you agree with that?
Q: Ok I can accept that. But if we remove the optimal choice of the CCP,
do the remaining problems require any modeling novelty?
A: In order to consistently price a deal cleared through a CCP (or alter-
natively a deal under a bilateral CSA) by taking into account residual
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credit risk and gap risk, initial and variation margins, collateral, close-
out netting rules, and wrong-way risk, one needs to have an analytical
set of tools similar to the collateralized CVA/DVA/FVA machinery we
described earlier. So yes, this requires the type of valuation we have
been talking about so far. This is investigated in the same framework
as CVA, DVA and Funding Costs in [86].
Q: Could I have some numerical examples, just to get a feeling, without
reading the whole paper with derivations and equations?
16 Valuation with C-D-FVA under CCPs: Nu-
merical Examples with Initial and Varia-
tion Margins
A: I can show you some figures which I obtained re-implementing the
equations in [86] with slightly different inputs. We are talking about a
client, say ”I”, trading with a counterparty via a CCP, and the coun-
terparty ”C” here is taken to be the clearing member in the CCP. The
investor ”I” deals with the clearing member ”C” without seeing the
real counterparty.
A: Understood. Shall we look at some figures now?
A: Good. Let me say that here we are looking at a case where the Investor
credit risk is higher than the credit risk of the clearing member, as is
realistic to expect. If a clearing member (CM) is riskier than I am as
an investor, then I have not much faith in the CCP employing that
CM. So I expect myself to be riskier.
Q: This is clear.
A: Fine, let me show you first this [brings on the tablet screen Figure 6].
In all the figures I will bring up I am showing you the pricing for a
10 years receiver Interest Rate Swap (IRS) cleared by a CCP, initially
traded at par. We start with funding costs and credit risk disregarded.
I show you the DVA impact that is the main credit feature, since I
am assuming I am pricing from the point of view of ”I”, the investor,
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in a scenario where ”I” has much higher credit risk that the CM, so
that DVA will dominate CVA. You remember our debate on CVA and
DVA last year, right? Even with collateral we’ll have DVA as I take a
margin period of risk of 5 days. Not so unrealistic since many collateral
disputes are settled in about 1 week or ten days. [11]
Q: Of course, but what is on the x axis here?
A: On the x axis you see the confidence level that is used in the calculation
of the initial margin. Basically the initial margin is taken as the Value
at Risk of the trade with a confidence level shown in the x axis. Clearly,
the higher the confidence level the safer the protection offered by the
initial margin, and indeed all graphs are decreasing.
Q: Ok, what is on the y axis?
A: This is the DVA (lowest continuous line) priced by the client and a few
quantiles of DVA future discounted cash flows whose expectation gives
the DVA price. The three DVA quantiles are at confidence levels 0.68,
0.95 and 0.997 (from bottom to top).
Q: An this second figure you are bringing up now?
A: This one [showing Figure 7 on the tablet screen] is the same exam-
ple as in the earlier figure but now we are plotting the funding price
component (price without funding minus price with funding) for a 10y
receiver IRS cleared by a CCP with initial margins at different levels
of safety. As before level of safety is meant as a confidence level for the
VaR that is used to establish the initial margin. We could use expected
shortfall (ES) as well.
Q: I see. It makes sense that funding costs increase with the level of safety
of initial margins. Safer initial margins are larger, corresponding to
larger VaR or ES due to larger confidence levels. I don’t need to see
the exact maths to see that the pattern makes sense. What next?
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Figure 6: DVA price and percentiles for a 10y receiver IRS cleared by a CCP
with initial margins at different levels of safety
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Figure 7: Funding price component (price with funding minus price without
funding) for a 10y receiver IRS cleared by a CCP with initial margins at
different levels of safety
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A: I am going to show you what happens if we remove collateralization
(variation and initial margins) entirely. Look at this [brings Figure
8 on screen]. Here there is no margin and we have CVA, DVA and
funding cost contributions. In particular, before you ask, on the x-axis
you see different values for the instantaneous correlation between short
term interest rates driving the IRS and default intensities. The black
continuous line is the IRS price inclusive of CVA and DVA but without
funding costs, the two components being separately plotted in black
dotted lines (CVA adjusted price is the lower line, and DVA adjusted
the upper line). The red continuous line is the price corrected also for
funding costs.
Q: It looks like the funding wrong way risk is less relevant than the credit
one?
A: This may have to do with the funding being a diluted effect whereas
the credit event may be a strong discontinuity that may be amplified
more dramatically by WWR. However in reality the situation is more
complex and you should really have a look at [86]
D. Brigo, A. Pallavicini: CCPs, Funding Costs, Collateral and Credit FAQ / Q&A 38
Figure 8: Funding price component (price with funding minus price without
funding) for a 10y receiver IRS cleared by a CCP with initial margins at
different levels of wrong way risk correlation
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Q: Let me be the judge of that. Let’s complete the numerical example.
A: All right. Next plot coming up [shows Figure 9]. Here I am showing
you a case without initial margin and with variation margins covering
different fractions of the mark to market (the fraction is in the x axis).
So if the fraction is 0 there is no variation margin, if it is 1 the variation
margin covers the whole mark to market, all other cases are in-between.
Q: What are the different lines?
A: The black continuous line is the IRS price inclusive of CVA and DVA
but without funding costs, the two adjusted components are separately
plotted in black dotted lines (CVA is the lower line, and DVA the upper
line). The red continuous line is the price corrected also for funding
costs.
Q: This makes sense too. As you cover more and more of the mark to
market with the variation margin, moving from left to right, all lines
converge to 0, meaning that residual CVA DVA and funding become
very small and approach zero with perfect variation margin and zero
initial margin. So here we get a feeling for what happens when initial
margin is neglected and variation margin may vary in effectiveness?
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Figure 9: CVA, DVA and Funding inclusive price (y axis) under variation
margin at different levels of mark to market coverage (x axis).
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A: Precisely. Finally I am going to show you one more figure: [brings on
the screen Figure 10]
Q: Are you getting the initial margin back into the picture now?
A: Correct. Now we have full variation margin (fraction 1 of mark to
market) for different confidence levels of the initial margins. The black
continuous line is the IRS price inclusive of CVA and DVA but without
funding costs, the two adjusted components are separately plotted in
black dotted lines (CVA is the lower line, and DVA the upper line as
before). The red continuous line is the price corrected also for funding
costs. I haven’t mentioned that ”mark to market” should be a little
more qualified, but you find all information in the full paper I mentioned
earlier.
Q: Any more comments on the background of this particular example?
A: Well in the examples I took the funding rates to be asymmetric and
somehow extreme: the borrowing rate spread is equal to the credit
spread of ”I”, the lending one to 0. Overall from the first figure 6 we
have seen that to get rid of rare events on DVA on needs to boost the
initial margin, resulting in relevant funding costs. Remember we take
a margin period of risk of 5 days.
Q: Sounds reasonable, but the good thing is you can get a quantitative
assessment here, not just qualitative.
A: In the second Figure 8 we saw that somehow WWR is less relevant
for funding than for credit, with the caveat that these risks may be
interconnected so this is to be qualified in a sense made precise again
in the full paper.
Q: Again reasonable, as we already commented earlier.
A: Then we analyzed in the remaining figures what happens when moving
from no collateral at all to just variation margins at different levels of
coverage (without initial margins), and then at the complete picture
with full variation margins but different levels of safety on initial mar-
gins. We saw the impact of funding to be relevant, the more so if one
keeps in mind that funding is a diluted effect and one would ususally
expect it to be limited.
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Q: I can see that the analytics and the kind of approach we discussed
allow for a quite precise analysis of the credit, collateral, funding and
margining patterns. Interesting.
A: The paper [86] also mentions MVA, Margin Valuation Adjustement or
something.
Q: I think we already have too many *VA’s and some are not separable,
as we discussed, so isn’t the introduction of further VA’s dangerous?
A: They have to be handled carefully and with proper analysis, that’s for
sure.
Q: So we are back there then... ok this looks like a good place to stop.
A: It’s fine but let me say we haven’t discussed multiple curves.
Q: Right... Tomorrow?
A: Can we do that next week please? I need a break!
Q: Of course, and Thank You!
17 Multiple Discount Curves and Credit-Collateral-
Funding
Q: [Three days later] Multiple curves: How do they connect with all you
told me so far?
A: The connection is made quite explicit in the paper [33].
Q: What’s the story?
A: The ”story” is that the classical relationship between forward LIBOR
rates and zero coupon bonds is not working anymore. In particular,
interpreting the zero-coupon curves as risk-free rate curves is no longer
tenable. Likewise, interpreting the LIBOR rates as the simply com-
pounded rates that underlie risk-free one-period swaps does not work
anymore. To include risks that are now heavily affecting interest rates,
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Figure 10: CVA, DVA and Funding inclusive price (y axis) under full varia-
tion margin and different confidence levels for the initial margin (x axis).
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one needs to design a theory that includes explicit cash flows account-
ing for default closeout and also for costs of funding for the hedging
portfolio, and costs of funding for collateral (margining).
Q: Even leaving aside the LIBOR rigging scandal... what are LIBOR rates
these days? I’m not sure anymore...
A: LIBOR is now a rate assigned by the market and not derived by risk-
free forward rate agreements or risk-free one-period swaps.
Q: How does this connect to our discussion?
A: By including credit, collateral and funding effects in valuation one ob-
tains the master equation seen earlier, for example, in [87, 88]. In
the specific case where collateral is a fraction of current all-inclusive
mark-to-market, one obtains a simpler pricing equation based on a
hedge-funding-fees equivalent measure and on a generalized dividend
process inclusive of default risk, treasury funding and collateral costs.
Q: hedge funding fees equivalent measure???
A: Remember our discussion on Q vs P [in [11]]? Now we have new Q’s
where assets evolve with local returns given by funding rates for the
hedging portfolios...
Q: Ah...
A: Again in [33] they apply these approximations to the money market,
in order to evaluate collateralized interest-rate derivatives.
They look at defining new building blocks that will replace the old
unobservables-based ones (such as risk free rate zero coupon bonds,
risk-free one period swap rates, etc). Such new instruments are based
on the collateral rate, which is an observable rate, since it is contrac-
tually defined by the CSA as the rate to be used in the margining
procedure.
Q: ISDA and CCPs are helping there...
A: The collateralized zero-coupon bond can be proxied by single-period
Overnight Indexed Swaps (or by quantities bootstrapped from multi-
period OIS) when we accept to approximate a daily compounded rate
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with continuously compounded rates. They then define fair OIS rates
at inception in terms of collateralized zero coupon bonds.
Q: And so LIBOR becomes...
A: This setup allows us to define new forward LIBOR rates as equilibrium
rates in a collateralized one-period swaps. The resulting rates depend
on the collateralized coupon-bearing bonds. They also define a collat-
eral based forward measure where forward LIBOR rates are expected
values of future realized LIBOR rates.
Q: Quite a market–based model...
A: They then hint indeed at the development of a market model theory
for the new collateral-inclusive forward LIBOR rates and to a forward
rates theory for the OIS-based instantaneous forward rates.
Q: And this is where the multiple curve picture finally shows up I guess
A: Indeed, they have a curve with LIBOR based forward rates, that are
collateral adjusted expectation of LIBOR market rates that are taken as
primitive rates from the market, and they have instantaneous forward
rates that are OIS based rates.
Q: Quite reasonable actually.
A: OIS rates are driven by collateral fees, whereas forward LIBOR rates
are driven both by collateral rates and by the primitive LIBOR market
rates.
Q: Ok this is a general framework and is very interesting, but are there
specific models discussed?
A: They approach this by introducing a dynamical multiple-curve model
for OIS and LIBOR rates, by reformulating the parsimonious HJM
model by [79, 80] under the new pricing framework.
Q: So those are the models they enrich with the credit, collateral and
funding analysis?
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A: Correct. They focus on uncollateralized, partially-collateralized and
over-collateralized contracts. With partial collateralization they evalu-
ate the adjustment needed by pricing equations to include the correc-
tions coming from Treasury cash and hedging funding.
In particular, forward LIBOR rates associated to partially collateral-
ized one-period swap contracts acquire a covariance term that can be
interpreted as a convexity adjustment.
Q: What happens with CCPs?
A: In that paper CCPs initial margins are modeled too. This leads to a
generalization of the master formula. However, a new difficulty arises.
If CCP cleared contracts will take over most of the market, then most
of the hedging activity will be implemented in terms of such products,
bringing in funding costs evaluation at the level of the probability mea-
sure definition, since the very instruments used to hedge will embed a
funding cost. From a practical point of view, this means that we may
need to adjust OIS curves for funding costs when bootstrapping the
discount curves (think of the Futures basis as a similar example).
The paper also discusses credit spreads. It is argued that credit spreads
should be calibrated via Credit Default Swaps or Defaultable Bonds.
However, again, this should be a global calibration because CDS are
collateralized and are in principle priced with the same general formula,
inclusive of collateral and funding, that is used for all other deals.
Q: Another ”Global Calibration”???
A: Well, bonds are not collateralized and are funded more heavily, so fund-
ing risk is also there. This global CDS or Bond calibration is not done
usually even though interpreting CDS or Bonds as sources of pure credit
risk calibration may lead to important errors.
Q: What about funding more specifically?
A: The term structure of funding rates depends on the funding policy and
is model dependent. Stripping it directly from market liquid instru-
ments is very difficult, especially because the interbank market is no
longer (fully) representative of such costs. Collateral portfolios play
now a key role too. Default intensities, collateral rates and liquidity
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bases will be key drivers of the funding spreads. Finally, one may con-
sider using Value-at-Risk measures to determine the effective fraction of
mark-to-market one should hold as collateral or even the initial margin,
as in our examples above, and introduce collateral haircuts.
Q: Quite a composite picture!
A: At least their final interest-rate curves are consistently explained by
such effects and based on market observables.
Q: I’ll concede this seems a paper worth reading as it seems to put all the
pieces together really.
A: Well I wouldn’t say ”all”, but indeed a lot... and this looks like a good
place for a break. [Smiling but looking tired]
Q: Absolutely. As usual I owe you, big time. May I invite you for dinner?
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